The Department of Diplomatic Enforcement (DODE)
Rather than put out statements begging to be in the room, there’s a way the British government could still – despite its diplomatic faux pas – add immense value to the new US Administration regarding Ukraine.
There’s one enormous role it could play, that the US has explicitly said it does not wish to manage; that’s an international opportunity ripe for the taking.
Presidential Envoy for Special Missions, Ric Grenell:
“One lesson I learned from the [2020] Kosovo-Serbia negotiations is that… The most important part, when you finally get two sides to come together to agree on something, is the follow up and holding them to account. The people that need to do that are the ones who negotiated, because they know where the weaknesses are… I wish, after we had made our big agreement, that there would have been more people holding both sides to account. There was never a team to push them… The failures of Minsk were we didn’t have any follow up. Once it was signed, a whole bunch of people celebrated and moved on. That would be different under a Trump Administration. There would be absolute holding people to their commitments… I think the tough part starts as soon as you sign the agreement.”
With negotiations now coming together between Presidents Trump and Putin, who’s poised to do the marathon work of holding each side to their commitments?
To accompany DOGE, there ought to be a new body…
The Department of Diplomatic Enforcement
Help make the new US Administration history’s most accomplished peacemaking Administration (which the US President has emphatically stated he wants) – and ensure that agreements struck last.
There’s a moment of malleability now to forge such an Office.
Here’s Dominic Cummings on implementation in government:
How are you actually going to implement this over many years? Everything like that is completely disdained [in traditional government]. It points to a general problem with our system. Everything to do with operations, and management, and actually getting things done, is the lowest status thing in Whitehall [and in Washington]. The highest status thing is nonsense about ‘political strategy’ and media and giving interviews. Everyone wants the word ‘strategy’ in their job title, and it’s practically always nonsense and shouldn’t be in their title, and the job would be improved by removing the word. Nobody wants to be on: logistics, operations, and actually making sure something happens. That is at the core of why so many things in government work the way they do.
You can see it in the whole policy process. The high-status thing is ‘writing the policy and then spinning it to the media’. The low-status thing is: what are the actual implementation details? Has someone already tried to do this in eight different countries in the last four years, and each time it’s been a disaster? No one cares about that. That’s left to much lower status jobs, and none of the senior people will pay attention to it. And they’re actually formally separated. So one of the things that we did in summer 2020 was, we said: the policy people should be brought together and actually physically sit with the management people – which was a completely revolutionary idea. Because that way, when you’re thinking up ideas in the first place, you’re immediately, from the beginning, talking to the people whose job it is to get it to work.
Rather than what happens now which is: these people sit around, they go to nonsense seminars, they talk to journalists and MPs, they publish a paper, it’s actually full of holes, it doesn’t work. That paper then goes off to the implementation people. The policy people then move on to whatever their next thing is. The management and implementation people look at it and go: ‘This is not going to work for the following reasons’ – but it’s their job to make it work. They then have to go back and start arguing. ‘But we already decided that we were going to do this nine months ago.’ ‘Yeah, but it can’t work.’ So our idea was: if you put the two together, then you actually find out on day one, or day four, ‘Oh, actually this is a stupid idea and it won’t work for the following reasons. We’re going to have to do it this way instead.’ No one [in traditional government] cares about that… No one actually cares if it doesn’t work.
This is now accepted – even by those running the Labour government.
The Department of Diplomatic Enforcement should emulate the way Jared Kushner project-managed the US border wall in 2019. Writing in Breaking History:
As the construction ramped up, I held weekly meetings in the Situation Room. I always began with two questions, typical of any construction project: Why is it taking so long? And why is it costing so much? ‘We are right on schedule,’ said Lieutenant General Todd Semonite, the impressive three-star general who ran the Army Corps of Engineers, in one of these weekly meetings. As he listed the construction numbers from the previous week, I opened my manila folder, pulled out the schedule from the week before, and double-checked the projections. ‘With all due respect, General, you’re not on schedule,’ I said. ‘Last week, you said that you’d be at a hundred and seventeen miles, and you’re only at one hundred and fifteen.’
‘General, unlike most of the jobs I have been assigned in government, this is one that I have a bit of experience in… I’ve never had a contractor admit to missing their schedule – they just keep revising the damn schedule. I know how to do this stuff. Every time we meet, I need you to give me an update on where we were the day before, and where we were projected to be. There are a lot of moving parts, and things will go better and worse than we expect. Let’s agree to have a transparent flow of information, and we will solve problems as they arise.’
I created a one-page spreadsheet, with specific tracking and updates to monitor the progress, and tasked one of my top lieutenants, an affable jack-of-all-trades named John Rader, to run point on coordinating the project. We all accepted accountability as a team, and we started to steamroll through the project.
To get it done, I applied a formula similar to the one I’d used for USMCA, the First Step Act, and the Middle East file. I defined success, developed a plan, and built a great team that was creative, agile, and focused intensely on execution.
Diligence of this degree does not exist inside any present diplomatic institution (domestic or international). The Department of Diplomatic Enforcement should create a new standard for monitoring the progress of signed peace agreements – focusing singularly on Ukraine to begin.
Crude mockup: After agreements are reached, the Department of Diplomatic Enforcement should produce routine reports on the health of an agreement. When meaningful roadblocks are hit, negotiators should be brought back in for a formal status check with signatories. Known consequences built into deal terms should they not be. The real-world implementation of agreements tracked.
The Department should cut through bureaucracy and go direct to the actual project manager (as junior as possible) in charge of each element. Not working up and down hierarchies through their superiors.
The Department of Diplomatic Enforcement:
- Should not do events
- Should not host conferences
- Should not throw seven-course dinners
- Should not write white papers
It should be totally outcome-oriented.
Underlying infrastructure does exist
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has a Ukraine observation mission with a budget of around €100 million. (It was supposed to monitor the Minsk agreements.) But a good piece critiquing it:
According to Moscow, the Organization is characterised by ‘amorphous structures’ and, without a legal international status, lacks relevance… the OSCE ultimately lacks international legal authority.
DODE does not need to recreate the OSCE. It needs to apply US (and British) accountability and oversight, improve international reporting lines, and have more forceful people at the top running it.
Who should staff the Department?
There appears to be something of a dichotomy in present US thinking.
Lt. General Kellogg, December 2024:
We’re going to use American influence. We’re going to basically Europeanise the war. Meaning more and more European influence; get them more involved in it. Is that going to be a positive sign? Is that going to help? I think it will, yeah. That’s the kind of approach we’re going to take.
Presidential Envoy for Special Missions, Ric Grenell:
The most important part, when you finally get two sides to come together to agree on something, is the follow up and holding them to account. The people that need to do that are the ones who negotiated – because they know where the weaknesses are. You have to be able to use the carrots and sticks in that instance. Remind them why they signed: ‘We know you don’t love moving this way, we know you don’t love making this concession, but it’s really important to do so.’
And Ric going on to say (correctly) that Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande, in the 2014 Normandy Format, were “not credible people. That would be different under a Trump Administration. There would be absolute holding people to their commitments.”
To reconcile the difference, could diplomatic implementation be managed by a group of “America First Europeans”?
From their perspective, Europeans who believe that Europe should get its house in order – and not be dependent on the US.
DODE should look to involve (cross-party):
- Nigel Farage (leader of Reform, personal friend of 47)
- Lord Maurice Glasman (the only Labour peer the US Administration invited to the President’s inauguration)
- Dominic Cummings (former chief advisor to the Prime Minister)
- Dominic Lague (Government Strategic Management Office, UK Cabinet Office)
- Baron David Frost (chief negotiator of Brexit)
- Baron Liam Booth-Smith (former chief-of-staff to Prime Minister Rishi Sunak)
- Tom Shinner (former Director of Policy and Delivery Coordination at the Department for Exiting the European Union)
- Lord Agnew (former Minister of State at the Cabinet Office)
The Department of Diplomatic Enforcement should tie-in also with the Vatican. This would be Europe “using its leverage” from the perspective of President Trump. It would give DODE a sense of moral legitimacy (with Moscow) that the OSCE always lacked. President Putin has met with Pope Francis three times, and visited the Vatican six times.
DODE thus dual-reporting into:
1) The White House
- Mark Burnett as US Special Envoy to the UK
- Ric Grenell – his comments in interviews having ignited the idea for DODE, and building infrastructure for diplomatic implementation now, for what are sure to be his forthcoming peace agreements (assuming his new role at the Kennedy Center will be interim)
A suggestion of two highly trusted US figures who could oversee the office:
- Fred Fleitz – not yet appearing to have taken a role in the Administration, yet having tremendous experience with the NSC, and being a key figure of the America First Policy Institute
- John Rader – who worked very closely with Jared Kushner in President Trump’s first term
2) The Vatican:
- Cardinal Matteo Zuppi – Pope Francis’s personal envoy for peace

London being significantly closer to Ukraine than Washington D.C., it would make sense to base Ukraine/Russia DODE oversight in London. It ought to be cross-party from a British perspective – to be on maximally useful (and welcome) terms with the US Administration. And it could be housed either inside the UK Foreign Office, or the giant US Embassy.
The Department would be a first step to encouraging allies themselves to do more. Not “America Alone”, but – starting with the UK – an in-built foothold for allies to assist with US-led diplomacy. As the WSJ Editorial Board noted in 2019, post-Brexit: “The world also needs the UK’s pro-American streak – as ballast between the US and Europe.”
The UK could put together a team which, under the aegis of President Trump, could monitor diplomatic enforcement in Ukraine.
If DODE can do a better job than the OSCE by itself, and help prevent the conflict recurring, it will save the US hundreds of billions – to say nothing of further untold deaths and destruction. Its positive impact would be surpassed only by DOGE.
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Edward M. Druce is a former 10 Downing Street Special Advisor, having worked with Dominic Cummings, then Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister, 2020–21
13 February, 2025
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