
JPRS-TAC-93-017
12
August
1993
COMMONWEALTH
OF
INDEPENDENT
STATES
11
Thus,
our
nuclear
weapons
do
not
pose
any
threat
to
other
states.
What
is
more,
we
do
not,
have
not,
and
will
not
set
ourselves
the
task
of
zeroing
them
in
on
a
target.
We
do
not
have
the
technological
capabilities;
nor
do
we
assign
our-
selves
such
a
task.
Thus,
these
nuclear
weapons
of
ours
are
a
legacy
and,
realistically
speaking,
they
cannot
be
reproduced
in
Ukraine.
That
is
to
say,
we
do
not
have
either
the
industry
or
the
technology—to
speak
nothing
of
the
enormous
funds
that
would
be
required
had
such
a
task
been
assigned.
However,
we
do
not
even
set
ourselves
that
task.
Our
course
is
nonnuclear,
and
we
proceed
toward
a
non-
nuclear
Ukraine.
That
is
one
aspect.
The
other
is
that,
indeed,
they
are
now
being
serviced
by
the
same
servicemen
as
those
who
serviced
them
when
there
was
a
Soviet
Union.
I
recently
visited
one
of
the
missile
units;
it
seems
to
me
you
were
there
with
me
and
saw
that
the
technological
level
of
their
servicing
was
quite
high.
It
was
done
with
great
responsibility
by
the
military.
We
settled
a
number
of
organizational,
material,
and
day-to-day
issues
there
concerning
those
people
dealing
directly
with
nuclear
weapons.
We
expressly
decided
there
that
those
nuclear
warheads—the
service
life
span
of
which,
if
I
could
say
so,
is
expiring—will
be
removed
and
transferred
to
appropriate
facilities.
That
is
to
say,
it
is
very
important
that,
regardless
of
how
the
ratification
progresses,
we
will
be
taking
the
war-
heads
off
those
missiles
for
which
the
service
life
span
has
expired
or
run
out
and
will
store
them
at
facilities
on
Ukrainian
territory
that
are
specially
adapted
to
suit
that
purpose.
So,
that
alone
dismisses
any
threat,
since
the
warheads
will
be
removed
from
especially
those
systems,
I
think,
that
were
built
quite
a
long
time
ago,
which
is
130
(?liquid-fuel)
missiles.
Thus,
both
politically
and
in
terms
of
our
course
and
the
capabilities
of
our
industry,
neither
our
policy
nor
our
position
on
these
missiles
poses
any
threat
to
other
states.
This
is
said
by
those
who
want
to
spoil
Ukraine's
image
and
present
the
picture
that
Ukraine
wants
to
profit
from
this,
that
Ukraine
is
supposedly
using
nuclear
weapons
like
a
large
stick
to
intimidate
someone.
Well,
all
of
this
is
insinuations,
insinuations
which
are
based
on
forcing
Ukraine
to
take
a
step
against
its
interests.
But
we
will
not
do
this,
because
we
rely
on
the
legislative
basis,
on
international
principles,
including
the
Vienna
Convention,
incidentally,
which
fixes
succession,
and
we
will
proceed
resolutely
along
the
course
toward
being
a
nonnuclear
state,
only—I
repeat—we
want
the
necessary
steps
to
be
taken
for
Ukraine
both
regarding
its
security
and
regarding
assistance
for
it,
and
regarding
certain
guarantees.
That
is
all;
nothing
else.
There
are
those
who
think
that
these
nuclear
weapons
can
be
utilized
to
make
some
kind
of,
well,
strike
on
some
potential
aggressor.
I
have
already
said
that
this
is
simply
unrealistic
from
the
technical
point
of
view,
but
this
is
not
the
main
thing.
The
main
thing
is
that
we
have
not
set
ourselves
this
task,
we
are
not
setting
it,
and
we
will
not
be
setting
it,
and
that
this
is
a
thread
running
through
all
of
our
documents,
including
the
latest
resolution
by
the
Supreme
Council,
which
I
have
just
quoted
to
you.
Ukraine's
Pavlychko
on
Possible
Ratification
of
START
I
Treaty
LD3107103193
Kiev
UNIAN
in
Ukrainian
1940
GMT
30
Jul
93
[Text]
Kiev—In
an
interview
for
the
"HOLOS
UKRAY-
INY"
newspaper,
Dmytro
Pavlychko,
chairman
of
the
Ukrainian
Supreme
Council
Commission
for
Foreign
affairs,
stresses
that
the
transfer
of
strategic
nuclear
weapons
to
Russia
"would
be
a
betrayal
for
which
there
is
no
justification."
He
reports
that
opinion
has
devel-
oped
in
the
Supreme
Council
that
we
should
deal
with
these
weapons
in
such
a
way
so
that
the
Ukrainian
people
get
some
materiel
benefit
from
this.
Dmytro
Pavlychko
believes
that
Ukraine
should
turn
the
right
to
possess
nuclear
weapons
into
guarantees
of
its
own
national
security.
Speaking
about
the
prospects
of
the
Supreme
Council's
examination
of
the
"START
I"
Treaty,
the
Lisbon
Pro-
tocol,
and
the
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Treaty,
the
com-
mission
chairman
says
that
"START
I"
will
probably
be
ratified
in
September
or
October
this
year.
The
ratification
of
the
Lisbon
Protocol
is
a
lot
more
complicated,
stresses
the
deputy.
It
can
be
ratified,
but
without
the
fifth
point,
which
says
that
Ukraine
should
accede
to
the
treaty
as
a
non-
nuclear
state.
Ukraine
has
a
partial
[nepovnyy]
nuclear
status.
Without
it
Ukraine
would
simply
not
be
a
part
of
the
"START
I"
Treaty.
In
the
opinion
of
Dmytro
Pavlychko,
the
46
solid
fuel
missiles
should
remain
on
Ukrainian
territory
until
the
Nuclear
Non-
Proliferation
Treaty
is
reviewed
in
1995.
But
even
after
this,
taking
into
account
the
complex
process
of
destroying
warheads
and
missiles,
some
part
of
the
nuclear
weapons
would
still
remain
on
Ukrainian
territory
for
some
time,
notes
D.
Pavlychko.
Pavlychko
Discusses
Nuclear
Weapons,
Fleet
AV1008156293
Prague
CESKY
DENIK
in
Czech
7Aug93p5
[C.
Svitak
and
T.
Zahradnicek
report:
"No
One
Is
Inter-
ested
in
Our
Gestures"]
[Text]
Dmytro
Pavlychko,
chairman
of
the
Ukrainian
Parliament
Foreign
Affairs
Committee,
held
talks
in
Prague
recently
with
his
Czech
counterpart,
Jiri
Payne,
and
Deputy
Foreign
Minister
Alexandr
Vondra.
We
took
the
opportunity
to
ask
him
about
the
future
of
nuclear
weapons
in
Ukraine
and
the
fate
of
the
Black
Sea
Fleet.
We
Will
Decide
Ourselves
About
Our
Nuclear
Weapons
The
foreign
policy
concept
approved
by
the
Ukrainian
Parliament
that
declares
the
former
Soviet
nuclear
weapons
deployed
on
Ukrainian
territory
to
be
Ukrainian
property
merely
expands
on
the
legal
norms
adopted
earlier.
On
10
September
1991
we
approved
a
law
making
all
property
situated
on
Ukrainian
territory
belong
to
the
republic.
The
nuclear
weapons
deployed
on
Ukrainian
territory
have
to
have
a
proprietor
who
can
decide
what
will
be
done
with
them.