ForeigN Policy aT BrookiNgs • Arms Contro l se r i e s
The TrilaTeral Process: t h e U n i t e d s tAt e s , U k r A i n e , r U s s i A A n d nU C l e A r We A p o n s
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tactical nuclear weapons, except for those belonging
to the Black Sea Fleet (whose ownership remained
disputed between Moscow and Kyiv) had been re-
moved from Ukraine.
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Whatever the reason for
the confusion—whether it reflected a disconnect
between the Ukrainian president and his defense
ministry or Russian removal of the weapons with-
out keeping Ukrainian officials informed—Ukraine
had fulfilled its commitment regarding the transfer
of tactical nuclear weapons, and with almost two
months to spare. e manner in which the tactical
weapons were withdrawn, however, left a bad after-
taste in Kyiv that likely complicated further discus-
sions between Ukraine and Russia on the strategic
nuclear weapons.
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e stage was set for Lisbon. American, Russian,
Belarusian, Kazakhstani and Ukrainian negotia-
tors gathered to hammer out the final language for
what became known as the Lisbon Protocol to the
START I Treaty. U.S. negotiator omas Graham
easily closed issues with the Belarusian and Kazakh-
stani sides but found coming to closure with his
Ukrainian counterparts difficult. ey indicated
uncertainty as to whether Foreign Minister Anatoliy
Zlenko would be able to sign the protocol. ey
resisted the document’s “inequality.” It could hardly
be otherwise: the protocol’s intent was to leave Rus-
sia as the only former Soviet state possessing strate-
gic nuclear arms. e U.S. side had thought this was
understood. Graham contacted the secretary’s party,
which was in London and due to arrive in Lisbon
the next day. Baker called Zlenko directly. While the
call proved very difficult, American officials believed
it did the trick.
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More work was needed on the ground in Lisbon, as
the sides continued to haggle over details on May
23. ey finally reached agreement, and Baker and
Zlenko joined Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Ko-
zyrev, Belarusian Foreign Minister Pyotr Kravchen-
ko and Kazakhstani State Counselor for Strategic
Affairs Tulegen Zhukeyev to sign the “Lisbon Pro-
tocol to the Treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Of-
fensive Arms.”
e protocol provided that Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Russia and Ukraine, as successor states to the Soviet
Union, would assume the Soviet Union’s START I
obligations. It required that Belarus, Kazakhstan and
Ukraine accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weap-
ons states “in the shortest possible time” and begin
“immediately” to pursue the internal constitutional
steps necessary to accomplish that. e protocol was
accompanied by the May 7 letter from Kravchuk
to Bush stating that Ukraine would “have a non-
nuclear status,” would “abide by the three non-nu-
clear principles [of its July 1990 Declaration of State
Sovereignty] in the future,” and would eliminate “all
nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive arms
located in its territory” within START I’s seven-year
period for implementation of reductions. Finally,
Kravchuk’s letter noted the importance of inter-
national monitoring to confirm that the nuclear
charges removed from the nuclear weapons were not
reused.
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(Shushkevich and Nazarbayev sent parallel
letters confirming that the nuclear weapons in Belar-
us and Kazakhstan would be eliminated within sev-
en years; U.S. officials had worked with Belarusian
and Kazakhstani diplomats to secure those letters
along with those countries’ agreement to the Lisbon
Protocol, though neither required as much work as
Ukraine.) e protocol recognized Ukraine as a suc-
cessor to the Soviet Union for purposes of START I,
a key point for Kyiv. Although the practical impact
was minimal, the Ukrainians appreciated the politi-
cal acknowledgment of Ukraine as a successor state
(the Lisbon Protocol remains the only legal docu-
ment in which Moscow recognized Ukraine’s claim
to successor state status.)
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e Lisbon Protocol proved a milestone. Looking
back on the process, a senior Ukrainian foreign min-
istry official later observed that, following Lisbon,
Ukraine was committed on a path to giving up all of
the nuclear weapons on its territory. e issue then
was the terms under which Ukraine would transfer
the nuclear warheads.
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Moscow also became more
convinced that, however haltingly, the Ukrainians
were prepared to give up the weapons.
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With the Lisbon Protocol completed, the U.S. Sen-
ate voted in October 1992 to give its advice and
