Chapter 1. An Infant in a Grownups’ Game
The USSR’s collapse had fundamentally changed the situation
around the implementation of STARTI. Since Ukraine, like Belar-
us and Kazakhstan, was not producing its own nuclear warheads,
the
path to
nuclear disarmament rested in the elimination of the
nuclear warheads themselves, rather than in the demolition of
nuclear warheads’ delivery mechanisms. This fundamentally new
circumstance was supposed to be taken into account by the MFA
in the course of the Lisbon Protocol’s execution.
The second time bomb inserted into the text of the Lisbon
Protocol by the US and Russia, which likewise went unnoticed by
Ukraine’s MFA, was Article V. It emerged unexpectedly and im
-
mediately before the Protocol’s signing. According to the article,
notwithstanding the fact that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
were to become parties
to STARTI and obligated to eliminate
nuclear weapons in place of the USSR, the three countries were
to accede to the NPT as nonnuclear- weapon states within the
shortest possible time.
This combination of terms was completely unlawful and
showed signs of diplomatic machinations. The Academy of Sci
-
ences Institute of Government and Law unequivocally concluded
t
hi
s in its analysis of the Lisbon Protocol, published in the article
entitled “Ukraine’s Nuclear Status: Legal and Political Issues.”
First, it wrote, “insisting on Ukraine’s ratification of STARTI fun
-
damentally constitutes the country’s recognition as a successor
to the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons, including the right of
ownership of
the portion of nuclear weapons that are located on
its territory.” This, emphasized the legal experts, “constitutes an
indirect recognition of Ukraine’s clear nuclear status; otherwise
it simply cannot become party to this agreement.”
74
In contrast, demanding that Ukraine join the NPT as a non-
nuclear state completely invalidated this right, as it was only
possible in two instances: either the non-
recognition of Ukraine’s
succession with regard to international treaties or the non-
recognition of Ukraine’s succession with regard to property locat
-
ed on its territory, which “unequivocally violates Ukraine’s suc-
cession rights with respect to the former USSR.” The Institute’s
experts stressed that Ukr
aine’s status “is not provided in the
T
reaty [NPT],” because the Treaty defined a nuclear- weapon state
only as one that has independently manufactured and tested a
nuclear explosive device. The Treaty’s language also did not pro
-
vide for instances in which a nuclear-
weapon state disintegrated,
creating several new states that now possessed its predecessor’s
nuclear weapons. Therefore, “Ukraine can only join the NPT on
the basis of this special status, as a temporary nuclear- weapon
state,” and this, they concluded, required amending the Treaty to
reflect the status Ukraine had at that time, while a “straightfor
-
ward accession to the NPT, without the corresponding amend-
ments, will be legally insolvent and fundamentally fruitless.”
75
The simultaneous ratification of both treaties, the NPT and
the START, along with the Lisbon Protocol, resulted in a diplo-
matic Catch
-22, automatically depriving Ukraine of its legal right
23. Signatures of the parties to the
Lisbon Protocol
