Chapter 2. Ukraine Formulates Its Position on Nuclear Arms
Since some of the most fantastic myths began sprouting up around the
effective disarmament strategy as soon as it was announced, Iwill provide the
main points of the strategy and outline their supporting arguments.
6
Point One: Ukraine Is the Owner of its Nuclear Arsenal
In accordance with international law, which includes two Vienna conven-
tions
—
On the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties of 1978; and On
the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, State Archives and
State Debts of 1983
—
all states formed on the territory of the former USSR
became its successors in terms of both tangible assets and international obli-
gations.
7
Armed with these laws, Western creditors demanded that not only
Russia but also the other independent states, which included Ukraine, repay
the former USSR’s debt obligations. Therefore, based on these laws, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan, by sharing the same status as Russia, became
nuclear- weapon states not only de facto, but also de jure. On the other hand,
only Russia possessed the full technological production capabilities for nuclear
warheads and, therefore, according to another international document
—
the
NPT
—
the other three countries were considered nonnuclear states.
The circumstances surrounding nuclear weapons on the territory of the
former USSR were fundamentally different from the American deployment of
its nuclear weapons in Western Europe; therefore, the US could not be used
as a precedent. The US had brought its weapons to Europe already manufac
-
tured, whereas Ukraine was directly involved in the creation of the USSR’s nu-
clear arsenal, having invested its own intellectual and material resources into
the weapons’ production. The signing of the Lisbon Protocol signaled that the
US recognized the distribution of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons
among
the newly independent states. Consequently, the immediate adoption of
a nonnuclear-weapon state status by Ukraine would have resulted in a legal co
-
nundrum: Who owned the nuclear weapons located on the territory of Ukraine?
If Ukraine was considered the owner of the nuclear weapons, it would
have to assume all obligations pertaining to them and then be responsible for
the process of their destruction. In this case, it would be a logical choice for
Ukraine to join STARTI as an equal party to the agreement. If, on the other hand,
Russia was considered the owner of these nuclear weapons, then Ukraine could
not take any responsibility for nuclear disarmament on its territory, because
it could not destroy another party’s property. In this scenario, Ukraine’s role
within the START would be unclear. Furthermore, the presence of the nuclear
weapons of another state (i. e., Russia)on our territory for the duration of the
disarmament process, which could take between seven and ten years, would
contradict the principles of neutrality already declared by Ukraine. Above all,
Parliament never approved the transfer of all the ownership rights of the for
-
mer USSR’s nuclear weapons exclusively to Russia. Therefore, the key political
and legal issues associated with the liquidation of nuclear weapons could only
be successfully resolved if
Ukraine became the owner of the nuclear arsenal
located within its territory, and if Ukraine retained the temporary status of a
nuclear-weapon state until the weapons were ultimately destroyed.
