
29
legal interpretation of this international recognition held that
Ukraine, and by implications the other signatory nations,
“owned” the nuclear warheads, missiles and bombers, and
infrastructure located physically on their territory. If that
were true, then returning these military forces and nuclear
warheads to another nation (Russia), or eliminating them
on-site in compliance with START, could raise a series of new
issues between the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan.
Using this U.S.-Ukraine joint statement as leverage,
Baker secured commitments from the other presidents
in May 1992. Their nations would be designated in a new
treaty protocol as “successor” states to the Soviet Union
for the START I Treaty. As such, they would have rights,
responsibilities and expenses under the treaty. They could
send their national on-site inspectors to verify elimination
of weapons systems in other nations; they were entitled to
a seat on a special treaty verification committee; and they
had to eliminate all the treaty-identified weapons located
on their territory within seven years following ratification.
All these rights and responsibilities were spelled out in the
new treaty protocol. Following intense negotiations with
the foreign ministers and presidents, Baker secured their
agreement to meet in Lisbon, Portugal on May 23, 1992
to
sign the new treaty protocol. As they did so, all five nations
became signatory states, turning the treaty from a bilateral
to a multilateral arms reduction agreement. The three non-
Russian nations committed to accede to the NPT Treaty “in
the shortest possible time” as non-nuclear states.
23
As part of the negotiations, Baker insisted that Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and Belarus provide a letter signed by their
presidents stating explicitly that their government would
sign and ratify the NPT Treaty and would declare themselves
as non-nuclear states. These presidential letters, the Lisbon
Protocol, and the START Treaty became the basis for the U.S.
Senate’s 93-6 ratification of the treaty in October 1992.
24
When the Russian Duma ratified the START Treaty 157-1 in
early November, it added explicit reservations that the three
non-Russian nations had to sign and ratify the NPT Treaty
before implementation would begin in Russia.
25
Secretary of State James A. Baker and President George H.W. Bush
George Bush Presidential Library