
46
With Courage and Persistence
Russia and Ukraine were at a breaking point. Prior to the
meeting, Marshal Shaposhnikov stated publicly that he
believed all nuclear weapons and forces should be transferred
immediately to Russia’s jurisdiction. At one point he
declared, “I am prepared to hand over the nuclear briefcase to
the Russian Defense Minister today or tomorrow...”
16
When
the meeting convened, the defense ministers from Russia,
Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed on a draft proposal that
explicitly declared that combat control over the combined
strategic nuclear forces would be exercised jointly by the
CIS High Command and the Russian Minister of Defense.
Belarus, taking it further, indicated its willingness to give
up legal rights to its strategic nuclear forces. At Ukraine’s
insistence, however, the proposal was dropped. When the
meeting ended, Shaposhnikov admitted publicly that it was a
failure and asked the defense ministers to negotiate bilateral
agreements that would define the jurisdiction, withdrawal
and transfer of their strategic nuclear warheads to Russia.
17
The next month, Russian leaders stepped up their pressure
to get legal, and then actual possession of all of the strategic
nuclear forces. In early November the Russian Duma ratified
the START I Treaty conditionally. It declared that Russia would
delay formal exchange of treaty documents until Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine ratified the START Treaty, signed
and ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT) Treaty, and
negotiated and signed bilateral agreements on the return of
their strategic nuclear weapons to the Russia. The Duma’s
vote, 157 to 1 in favor, endorsed the government’s policy on
the “inherited” strategic nuclear forces in the non-Russian
states.
18
Here was another sign that the Russian government,
for all practical purposes, had abandoned its support for
the CIS Armed Forces. Among the governments of Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and Belarus, the real issue was not which nation
had operational control over the strategic nuclear forces,
but which entity “owned” the bases, forces, weapons and
facilities of the strategic forces located in these nations.
National leaders in Ukraine and Kazakhstan insisted that
the CIS charter, which had been agreed to unanimously in
December 1991 in Almaty, stated that the new states were
entitled to all of the property within their borders.
19
This,
however, was a tenuous claim. The CIS agreement specified
control over the strategic nuclear forces, not ownership. To
strengthen its position, the government of Ukraine clarified
its claim on ownership in early November 1992, only a week
after the Russian Duma had ratified the START Treaty. “The
property of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union,”
U.S. President George H.W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin sign START II, January 1993
George Bush Presidential Library