Decommissioning militias
The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning in Northern Ireland
The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning was established on August 26, 1997, to oversee the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons in Northern Ireland. Chaired by General John de Chastelain of Canada, the commission also included Brigadier Tauno Nieminen of Finland, and Ambassador Donald C. Johnson from the US – who was replaced by longtime Foreign Service Officer Andrew D. Sens from 1999.
In the Good Friday Agreement (1998), the participants reaffirmed their commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations by May 2000 – a deadline that was repeatedly missed and extended. After the signing of the Agreement, the Republicans claimed they had no formal links with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and therefore could not influence them. David Trimble and the Ulster Unionist Party threatened to walk away from the peace deal over this issue and refused to form a power-sharing government after the July 1998 elections.
A key issue for the IRA was that they did not want to be seen as surrendering their weapons as defeated losers in the conflict. This led to a protracted and increasingly desperate period of stalemate. By June 2001, General de Chastelain and other members of the commission were on the verge of quitting as a result. In a frank meeting with senior officials from the Department of Justice and the Northern Ireland Office on June 27th, the Canadian General gave a downbeat assessment of the likelihood of decommissioning.
However, the events of 9/11 proved a turning point and played a significant role in catalyzing the process. On September 20, 2001, the IRA agreed on a highly secretive method of decommissioning its arms, and made the historic announcement that it had actually begun the process only a month later. The decommissioning was witnessed by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and two churchmen – West Belfast-based Catholic priest Father Alex Reid, and former Methodist Church President, Reverend Harold Good – who went on record to say:
The experience of seeing this with our own eyes, on a minute-to-minute basis, provided us with evidence so clear and of its nature so incontrovertible that at the end of the process it demonstrated to us – and would have demonstrated to anyone who might have been with us – that beyond any shadow of doubt the arms of the Irish Republican Army have now been decommissioned.
No photographs were taken of the decommissioning. The finer details of how and where those groups disposed of their weapons has, to this day, never fully been told. Understandably, some unionists were unhappy about the lack of transparent verification. The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning declared that the IRA had decommissioned all of its weapons in 2005, shortly after the republican group formally ordered an end to its armed campaign. It is largely seen as a lasting and enduring success.
Why the (2014, Minsk Agreements) Trilateral Contact Group failed
There was no effective enforcement mechanism in place. The Minsk Accords and Good Friday Agreement share similarities in terms of ambiguous provisions, and conflicting interpretations of sequencing. But the Irish Republican Army had more incentive to heel than Ukraine’s militias because of its desire to form (through its political wing) a legitimate power-sharing government, especially given the pronounced increase in hostility from the US post-9/11.
Kyiv refused to recognize the leaders of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic as signatories to the Minsk accords.
External powers were more involved in Northern Ireland, creating a single, stable, and well-managed process which compelled the participation of domestic armed groups, while clearly setting and enforcing the parameters of talks.
The great secrecy around the IRA’s decommissioning allowed the paramilitary organization to save face, and claim it had not been defeated. It sufficed, for the most part, that independent observers had confirmed full and proper decommissioning. Yet as shown by the rejection of the Steinmeier Formula (which called for elections to be held in the separatist-held territories, though with the caveat that self-governing status would only be granted once the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) had judged the balloting to be free and fair) by nationalist forces in Ukraine, there was no equivalent trust in the credibility or capability of independent observers when it came to overseeing elections in Donetsk and Luhansk.
Many Ukrainians didn’t trust OSCE inspectors because they thought the presence of Russian troops would still unfairly influence elections.
In contrast, David Trimble (leader of the Ulster Unionist Party) only agreed to accept decommissioning as a subsequent condition (rather than a pre-condition) of the Good Friday Agreement after Prime Minister Tony Blair gave him his personal assurance that he would eject Sinn Fein from the Northern Ireland Executive if the Irish Republican Army failed to decommission – a commitment reiterated by President Clinton in the closing hours.
Some Ukrainian nationalists point-blank refused to accept the 2014/15 idea of granting autonomy to the Donbas regions.
With the Good Friday Agreement, America was involved. It had US Presidential attention. With the Minsk accords, America was absent (even cosying up to Russia while seeking co-operation in Syria and with the Iran Nuclear Deal), leaving France and Germany in charge. The two then were not powerful enough to impose what had been agreed.